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Abstract: 
The object of this research is to study the new counter-terrorism measures which are 
being adopted in the EU after the terrorist attack that occurred in Paris (January 2015). 
Due to the fact that the EU is a supranational organization with primarily economic 
goals instead of political ones, its Member States keep their competencies on security 
matters, leaving the role of the EU as a mere coordinator of Member States’ security 
policies. However, the reactions caused by this new attack suggest that the situation 
could change in the coming years. The issue is very important as it is not only our safety 
at stake, but also our fundamental rights, which are in conflict with some of the new 
measures proposed. 
Keywords: Counter-terrorism, Paris attacks, 9/11, Area of freedom, security and 
justice, Jihadism, Human rights, Security, European Union. 
 
Resum: 
L’objecte d’aquesta investigació és l’estudi de les noves mesures que estan essent 
adoptades a la UE per a la lluita contra el terrorisme, després dels atemptats terroristes 
comesos a París (al gener de 2015). Pel fet que la UE és un ens supraestatal de caràcter 
eminentment econòmic més que no pas polític, encara els seus estats membres 
mantenen les seves competències en matèria de seguretat, deixant a la UE el paper de 
simple coordinador entre les polítiques de seguretat d’aquests. Tot i això, les reaccions 
que ha provocat aquest nou atemptat fan preveure que la situació podria canviar als anys 
vinents. La qüestió és molt important, ja que no només està la nostra seguretat en joc, 
sinó també els nostres drets fonamentals, els quals entren en conflicte amb algunes de 
les noves mesures proposades. 
Paraules clau: Lluita contra el terrorisme, Atemptats de Paris, Àrea de llibertat, 
seguretat i justícia, Gihadisme, Drets humans, Seguretat, Unió Europea. 
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I. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
9/11  September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US 
AFSJ  area of freedom, security and justice 
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CJEU  Court of Justice of the EU 
Charter Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
CIS  Customs Information System 
CTC  Counter-terrorism Coordinator 
CTS  Counter-terrorism Strategy 
DRD  Data Retention Directive 
EU  European Union 
EP  European Parliament 
ETA  Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
IRA  Irish Republican Army 
ISF  Internal Security fund 
ISIS  Islamic State 
JHA  Justice and Home Affairs 
LIBE  Civil liberties committee of the European Parliament 
MEP  member of the European Parliament 
MLA  Treaty on extradition and mutual legal assistance 
NSA  National Security Agency 
PEC  Political European Cooperation 
PNR  Passengers Name Record 
SIS  Schengen Information System 
SWIFT Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
TEU  Treaty on European Union 
TFUE  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TFTP  Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 
US  United States of America 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
"Their prophet is Satan. There is no connection between the 
Islamic faith and this minority” 
Hassan Chalghoumi (an imam of the Paris suburb of Drancy), after Charlie Hebdo attacks. 
 
The threat of Islamic terrorism is increasing every day. Several hideous actions 
committed in the last decade by terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State 
(ISIS), Boko Haram, and Jabhad al-Nusra have horrified the entire world. Now 
terrorism is one of the major global concerns and increasing security standards a general 
will. 
The European Union (EU) is no stranger to this menace. European jihadists 
returning from the Middle East represent a considerable threat to the EU. As a matter of 
fact, of all different kinds of terrorism, jihadi terrorism is the most threatening one to 
Western societies. Terrorist attacks such as those occurred in Madrid (March 2004), 
London (July 2005), Toulouse and Montauban (March 2012), the murder of a British 
Army soldier in Woolwich (May 2013), and of course the most recent in Paris and in 
Copenhagen (January and February 2015 respectively), are examples of attacks that 
occurred in the last decade that have brought the issue of “home-grown” Islamist 
extremism to the forefront of European political debate. While freedom of movement of 
capital, goods, services and labor are welcomed features of the common European 
market, free movement of criminals and terrorists is clearly an unwanted corollary. 
After the Paris and Copenhagen attacks, numerous debates have risen at the 
national and the EU level for the prevention of further jihadist attacks within the EU 
borders. According to the Guardian, since mid-2014 and March 2015 the number of 
foreign fighters spiked 71%, coming from at least half of the countries of the world.
1
 
Taking into account the increasing number of Islamic extremist fighters with an EU 
passport currently joining ISIS and Al-Qaeda, it is noticeable that the problem is getting 
worse day after day. This is the reason why several Ministers of the Interior from the 
Member States have pushed for the adoption of new counter-terrorist measures since the 
                                                          
1
 The Guardian. Iraq and Syria are 'finishing schools' for foreign extremists, says UN report. [Online] 
www.theguardian.com. Consulted on 02/04/15. 
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Charlie Hebdo attacks. There is a general will to enhance cooperation between EU 
Members States to confront more efficiently this global threat. In the last years, with the 
rise of the Islamic extremism and the returning jihadists, the Commission has tried to 
put in place a battery of measures which either the European Parliament (EP) or some 
Member States have opposed. Now however, Paris attacks are helping to unblock some 
of these measures. 
It is worth noting that the EU has traditionally preserved high standards of the 
rights of its citizens, especially in comparison to the practice of the United States of 
America (US) since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (hereinafter referred as 
to 9/11). Despite the rights of the EU citizenship are one of the greatest achievements of 
Europe, this situation might change after the Paris shootings.  
The present research will examine if the EU is experiencing a new approach in 
the field of security after the Charlie Hebdo attacks. In order to do this, this study will 
establish a comparison between the possible new EU security legal framework and the 
scheme existing in the US. In addition, it will analyze what rights of the EU citizenship 
could be jeopardized in case new EU security measures are eventually adopted. 
This research is divided into three main sections: First, the EU current legal 
framework and the evolution of the counter-terrorism measures adopted by the EU (and 
its predecessor, the European Communities) are described. Second, the most significant 
consequences of these measures are highlighted. Finally, specific measures that are 
currently being discussed by the EU institutions after the Paris attacks are analysed. 
There are forecasted as part of the new EU counter-terrorism legal framework. 
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III. EVOLUTION OF THE EU COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY 
a) Origins of the EU counter-terrorism policy 
Prior to 9/11, the EU practically could not be considered as a counter-terrorism 
actor, despite its relatively long history of police cooperation. The European integration 
project, which started in the 1950s, was born only with exclusive and explicitly written 
economic goals: The gradual creation of a customs union and a common market. The 
political union was an objective left aside with the intention to work on it progressively 
in a later stage. 
When the former Political European Cooperation (PEC) began in the early 
1970s, the Member States of the then-European Communities started to experience 
higher terrorism threats, and therefore they began to strengthen their cooperation. These 
threats manifested themselves in incidents instigated by Western Europeans, such as of 
the Red Brigades
2
 in Italy, the Red Army Fraction
3
 in Germany, the ETA
4
 in Spain and 
France, the IRA
5
 in Ireland, as well as other Middle Eastern organizations, in the late 
1960s and the beginning of the 1970s.
6
 As a result, the TREVI group was created as a 
counter-terrorism forum, under the impetus of the Rome European Council in 1975. 
TREVI was an informal body which worked as an intergovernmental network, outside 
the European Communities legal framework. It was composed by Ministers for the 
Interior of the Communities, or ministers with similar responsibilities. Initially it was 
intended to coordinate counter-terrorism responses among Member States by 
exchanging information and mutual assistance on terrorist threats while creating 
                                                          
2
 The Red Brigades was a Marxist-Leninist left-wing terrorist group founded by students, active in Italy 
between the 1970s and the early 1980s. 
3
 The Red Army Fraction was an anti-fascism radical left-wing terrorist group. It was founded in 1968 
after a student protest in West Germany, and it ceased to exist in 1998. 
4
 Acronym for Euskadi Ta Askatasuna. It is a paramilitary organization with the goal of gaining 
independence from Spain and France for the Greater Basque Country. It was founded in 1958 and 
announced a definitive ceasefire in 2011. 
5
 The IRA (also denominated PIRA: Provisional Irish Republican Army), was an Irish republican 
paramilitary organization with the goal of unify Ireland. It was re-founded in 1969 and it ceased to exist 
in 2005. 
6
 BURES, Oldrich. EU Counterterrorism Policy. A Paper Tiger? Ashgate, Farnham, 2011, p. 60. 
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complementary strategies between Member States. In the mid-l980s, the group’s 
purpose was extended to address issues such as cross-border policing, illegal 
immigration, police cooperation and the fight against organized crime. The group 
ceased to exist when it was integrated into the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar of 
the EU in 1992.
7
 
The creation of TREVI was followed by other intergovernmental meetings for 
the combat against terrorism in 1971-1972. Despite the positive impact of TREVI, the 
fight against terrorism was an almost exclusive domestic competence of the Member 
States. Bilateral or multilateral cooperation between Member States was established to 
deal with singular cases; however, there were few EU initiatives at that time. The EU 
merely discussed terrorism matters on a political level. In fact, cooperation in the Justice 
and Home Affairs area may be considered a recent EU policy, mentioned for the first 
time in the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU) in 1992.
8
 The TEU pushed further and 
introduced the fight against terrorism in the former third pillar
9
 clearly identifying that 
the notion of terrorism was no longer an exclusive matter of the Member States. 
However, in the subsequent years the EU made slow progress, and only the Tampere 
European Council in 1999 tried to develop the JHA pillar.
10
 Nevertheless, few of the 
measures discussed in the Tampere European Council were implemented prior to the 
9/11 attacks. 
 
b) Counter-terrorism measures adopted between 9/11 and the Lisbon Treaty 
The 9/11 attacks changed the perception of security of the overall society. After 
9/11, Al-Qaeda cells were discovered in the EU, especially in Germany. In order to 
                                                          
7
 TEASDALE, Anthony. BAINBRIDGE, Timothy. Trevi Group. [Online] 
http://penguincompaniontoeu.com. The Penguin Companion to European Union. Consulted on 02/05/15. 
8
 Title VI TEU. 
9
 The TEU divided European actions into three different categories: the “European Communities” pillar, 
the “Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)” pillar, and the above-mentioned JHA pillar. Supra-
nationalism was strongest in the first pillar, while intergovernmental cooperation was present in the 
second and third pillar. This structure was abandoned after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 
2009. 
10
 Council of the EU. Living in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 2005, p.11. [Online] 
www.consilium.europa.eu/en. Consulted on 03/05/15. 
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prevent future terrorist attacks on EU soil, the EU adopted a significant number of 
counter-terrorism measures, with the aim to rapidly grow the EU competence for 
counter-terrorism. In some cases, the EU adopted those measures exceeding its own 
legal competences, such as the first EU-US Passenger Name Record agreement (PNR) 
concluded in 2004.
11
 However in practice, those measures did not end up being as 
ambitious as it originally seemed. This may be due to the fact that the EU has 
traditionally considered as non-negotiable the necessity of a legal basis for the adoption 
of new security measures. 
Already in November 2001, the European Council adopted an Action Plan on 
Combating Terrorism.
12
 This Plan served as the basis for the policy of legal instruments 
adopted in the course of the following months. Among these legal instruments, the most 
significant ones are the two Council Framework Decisions of June 2002 on Combating 
Terrorism and the European Arrest Warrant.
13
 These Council Framework Decisions 
included a definition of the term terrorism.
14
 Therefore, the definition of terrorism 
formulated by the EU refers to “intentional acts that were committed with the aim of 
seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or 
international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously 
destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
structures of a country or an international organization”.15 The issue is important as 
there is no a generally accepted definition of the term terrorism among scholars, policy-
makers, politicians, and experts. According to Alex Schmid, this lack of consensus is 
                                                          
11
 BLASI CASAGRAN, Cristina. The future EU PNR system: Will passenger data be protected? 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Vol. 23, Issue 3, 2015. p.243. 
12
 WOUTERS, Jan. DUQUET, Sanderjin. Managing the Unmanageable: The European Union and 
Terrorism. Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Nº 122, Leuven, 2014. [Online]: 
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/wp122-wouters-duquetupdateapril2014.pdf. Consulted on 
12/04/15. p. 3. 
13
 The European Arrest Warrant was adopted in June 2002, replacing the extradition system, to simplify 
and accelerate procedures, replacing the administrative and political phase by a judicial mechanism. See 
also: GARCÍA-MALTRÁS, Elsa. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters and fight against terrorism: 
the Council Framework Decisions on combating terrorism and the European Arrest Warrant. [Online] 
https://infoeuropa.eurocid.pt. Consulted on 10/05/15. 
14
 BAKKER, Edwin. Jihadi terrorists in Europe: Their characteristics and the circumstances in which 
they joined the jihad: an exploratory study. Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Clingedael, 
The Hague, 2006. p. 2. 
15
 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA). 
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caused by four reasons: the fact that terrorism is a contested concept, linked to 
delegitimization and criminalization, the existence of many types of “terrorism” with 
different forms and manifestations, and finally that the term is undergone changes in 
meaning in more than 200 years of existence.
16
 Therefore, having an EU definition of 
terrorism is essential, as one man’s terrorist may be another man’s freedom fighter. 
Nevertheless, the EU counter-terrorism actions suffered from a lack of 
coherence. Trying to establish a more comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism, the 
European Council adopted a European Security Strategy in December 2003. In this 
strategy, terrorism was listed as the major threat that Member States had to confront, 
and proclaimed that European actions against terrorism were indispensable. 
One of the measures adopted by the European Council which has become one of 
the most important counter measures of Islamist terrorism to date was the creation of a 
blacklist in 2001.
17
 Such blacklist included persons, groups, and entities whose financial 
assets would be frozen, and to whom financial services would henceforth be denied. 
Therefore the EU hampered the terrorist to operate and raise funds in the EU.
18
 
Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004)
19
 and London (2005),
20
 the next 
action to preserve EU safety was an EU Counter-terrorism Strategy (CTS),
21
 agreed 
upon in December 2005, which also contained a definition of terrorism based on the 
risks of the threat presented. Before the CTS, just six of the then 15 Member States 
recognized terrorism as a special offense. This definition included radicalization and 
terrorist recruitment as part of terrorism. It is important to highlight that the London 
                                                          
16
 SCHMID, Alex. Perspectives on Terrorism. Volume 6, Issue 2. Handbook of Terrorism Research, 
London, 2011. p. 158. 
17
 SULLIVAN, Gavin. HAYES, Ben. Blacklisted: Targeted sanctions, preemptive security and 
fundamental rights. European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights. Berlin, 2009. p. 11. 
18
 MCNAMARA, Sally. The EU–U.S. Counterterrorism Relationship: An Agenda for Cooperation. The 
Heritage Foundation, 2011. [Online] http://www.heritage.org. Consulted on 6/05/15. 
19
 On March 11, 2004, an Al-Qaeda affiliated group planted ten bombs which were remotely detonated on 
four trains, killing 191 people and injuring more than 1.800. 
20
 On July 7, 2005, four British Islamist terrorist detonated four bombs in three subways and in a bus, 
killing 56 people, and injuring more than 700. 
21
 Council of the EU. The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy. [Online] 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST+14469+2005+REV+4. Consulted on 17/06/15. 
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attacks confronted the EU with the reality of homegrown Islamic terrorists for the first 
time, which reinforced the EU’s strategy of focusing greater attention on the root causes 
of terrorism. 
The fatal events that occurred in Madrid heightened the sense of vulnerability of 
the EU and proved that a deeper coordination between Member States was needed. 
Therefore, the European Council created the position of EU Counter-terrorism 
Coordinator (CTC), and appointed Gijs de Vries as the first one.
22
 The CTC was 
structured as a component of the external dimension of the EU counter-terrorism policy 
to work within the Council Secretariat, increasing the role of the EU in the fight against 
terrorism on the international stage. Nevertheless, the powers of the CTC have not 
increased at all since its creation, which seems like a missed opportunity to enhance 
cooperation in counter-terrorism, taking into consideration that aside from persuasion, 
the CTC does not have any real power. 
On March 2007, a memorandum from the Commission listed 51 adopted and 33 
proposed pieces of legislation in the field of security. Also 22 communications and 21 
reports were released under the heading of the fight against terrorism.
23
 Furthermore, 
specialist antiterrorist teams within Europol and Eurojust were established. External 
action in the field of law enforcement cooperation with third-party countries was also 
strengthened throughout the Europol-US agreement on the exchange of personal data, 
and the EU-US agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance, among others. 
During that period, the EU also decided to amend several databases storing data 
for border management and security purposes. In many cases, the shift of the purpose of 
the EU measures was noticeable, from border control functions to law enforcement 
purposes. For instance, that “function creep” was seen in Eurodac, Customs Information 
System (CIS) and Schengen Information System (SIS). 
Eurodac database is the European fingerprint database for the identification of 
asylum seekers and irregular border-crossers. It has been operating since January 2003 
                                                          
22
 In 2007 Gijs de Vries resigned and Gilled de Kerchove was appointed to replace him. See also: 
PHILIP, Christian. L’Europe face au terrorisme. Quelle valeur ajoutée? Assemblée Nationale. Rapport 
d’information nº 2123, 2005. p.61. 
23
 European Commission website. Commission Activities in the Fight against Terrorism. [Online] 
http://ec.europa.eu. Consulted on: 19/05/15. 
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to determine whether asylum seekers have already applied for asylum in another 
Member State or have illegally transited through another one. Another database 
amended was the CIS. This database centralizes customs information in order to ensure 
the correct application of the customs and agricultural legislation,
24
 but it was later 
amended to allow access to law enforcement authorities too.  Finally, with regard to 
SIS, it is a large-scale information system with the purpose of maintaining and 
distributing information on individuals and objects of interest. Its intended use was 
originally to support the external border control in the Schengen area. Now it has 
extended its scope to law enforcement, with the adoption into force of the second 
generation of SIS (SIS II) in 2013.
25
 All of these databases allow today the access to law 
enforcement authorities for the prevention and combating of crimes. 
The collection of information is a vital factor in counter-terrorism. For this 
reason, the Data Retention Directive (DRD)
26
 was created in the aftermath of the 
Madrid and London attacks. The objective was to harmonize the EU efforts to fight the 
most serious crimes, including terrorism. That Directive obliged Member States to store 
citizens' telecommunications data for a period of time between 6 and 24 months. Under 
the Directive, law enforcement agencies were able to request access to certain 
categories of traffic data, such as IP addresses, time of use of every email, phone calls 
made and text messages sent or received. However in April 2014, the DRD was 
annulled by the CJEU.
27
 
In addition, a series of PNR international agreements have been adopted in the 
EU.
28
 PNR agreements’ allow Member States to access to data provided by airline 
companies during the reservation and booking of tickets, and when checking in on 
                                                          
24
 Official website of the European Union. CIS System. [Online] 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/customs/l11037_en.htm. Consulted on 05/04/15. 
25
 The SIS II have replaced and improved the former SIS. However, it continues being a measure that 
might conduct to infringements of the EU fundamental rights. 
26
 Formally: Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament (EP) and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 
2002/58/EC. 
27
 The DRD decision will be developed in the fifth section of the present study. 
28
 GEOFFROY, Guy. Utilisation des données des dossiers passagers (PNR) à des fins répressives. 
Assemblée Nationale. Rapport d’information nº 1447, 2009. 
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flights. The EU adopted PNR sharing agreements with the US and Australia (a PNR 
agreement with Canada was proposed but never set into action, and it is currently being 
reviewed by the CJEU, as it will be explained below). Moreover, following the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Commission proposed the adoption of an EU 
PNR,
29
 which will be object of analysis below as well. 
 
c) The Treaty of Lisbon: A new scenario 
 The Treaty of Lisbon was signed in December 2007, and entered into force on 
the December 1, 2009. It stipulates that one of the key objectives of the EU is to provide 
citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice 
(AFSJ).
30
 Likewise, the article 6 TUE gave binding effects to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter referred as to the Charter). This 
new legal status of the Charter implied a change of paradigm and created a new legal 
basis for a higher protection of fundamental rights within the EU. Consequently, the 
Treaty of Lisbon implied a new scenario in the realm of counter-terrorism. 
The Lisbon Treaty also provided competences in the field of security to the EU. 
The new legal framework raised a debate on whether the EU should increase the 
security measures, or otherwise it should adopt measures to more efficiently protect the 
rights of the EU citizenship. However, the binding force of the Charter did not imply a 
change of the EU priorities, but rather a new and more powerful legal basis to defend 
the rights of the EU citizenship. 
The Treaty of Lisbon had a much bigger impact in counter-terrorism internally 
as opposed to externally. This phenomenon was due to the change of structure of the 
EU. The abolition of the three pillar structure implied that foreign policy and JHA 
began to be considered as part of the EU matters, with the application of the so called 
                                                          
29
 European Commission website. Police Cooperation. [Online] http://ec.europa.eu. Consulted on 
06/04/15. 
30
 Preamble and article 3 TUE. 
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“community method”.31 The EU now formally enjoys shared competence together with 
the Member States in the JHA area, and the EU role in counter-terrorism policymaking 
has been supra-nationalized. Because of this, the EU started to have a greater role in 
security matters post-Lisbon Treaty, giving the new decision-making process the same 
powers to the EP than to the Council of the EU.
32
 
The Lisbon Treaty also entailed a series of institutional changes that must be 
taken into consideration, as they have enhanced the actorness of the EU in the area of 
counter-terrorism. For instance, the role of the EP became more relevant as it reinforced 
its powers, acquiring co-decisional powers together with the Council.
33
 This is an 
important point as the EP has traditionally shown distinct views from the ones of the 
Commission and especially the Council (i.e. the Member States) on many issues related 
to security and fundamental rights. 
Another important change was the fact that the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU) extended its jurisdiction to cover also security measures part of the former third 
pillar.
34
 The importance of this new situation has been demonstrated by the recent DRD 
decision.
35
 The DRD decision
36
 has major significance as it might have implications for 
other security measures, such as the SWIFT agreement or the various PNR agreements 
adopted in the EU. In fact, the CJEU has already annulled the first EU-US PNR for not 
being adopted under the proper legal basis.
37
 It is worth concluding that the EP voted in 
                                                          
31  The community method is characterized by the central role of the Commission in formulating 
proposals; qualified majority voting in the Council (may be exceptions); involvement of the EP (with 
varying intensity); and the role of the CJEU in ensuring judicial accountability. 
32
 RENARD, Thomas. EU Counterterrorism Policies and Institutions After the Lisbon Treaty. Center on 
Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. Policy Brief, Brussels, 2012, p.15. 
33
 Article 218 TFUE. 
34
 Although this new competence of the CJEU effectively began on November 30, 2014, after a five-year 
transitional period. This is the reason why it did not had an impact on counter-terrorism policies until that 
date. See also: Article 263 TFUE. 
35
 Despite it was formally part of the first pillar, the DRD was a third pillar measure “masked” as a first 
pillar decision. 
36
 Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) of April 8, 2014. Joined 
Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12. Digital Rights Ireland Ltd (C-293/12) v Minister for Communications, 
Marine and Natural Resources and others and Kärntner Landesregierung (C-594/12) and others. 
37
 EU-US passenger data transfer deal annulled by European Court. [Online] http://www.genewatch.org. 
Consulted on 16/05/15. 
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favor to refer the EU-Canada PNR to the CJEU, and the Court is currently deciding 
about its compliance with the Charter.
38
 
                                                          
38
 All these CJEU decisions will be further explained below. 
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IV. EU LEGAL ASSESSMENT FROM 9/11 TO THE PARIS ATTACKS 
a) The leading role of the US 
After 9/11, increasing security became a priority for the western world. It 
became evident that the Islamic terrorism was a global threat and that terrorists could 
strike again, not only in the US but also in Europe. Since the 9/11, both the EU and the 
US recognize that they need each other to fight this global threat. Despite this, there has 
been some confrontation when adopting common measures, mostly caused by the 
different treatment given by the EU and the US to the protection of the rights of their 
citizens. 
The immediate aftermath of 9/11 was the adoption of the USA Patriot Act,
39
 
which was a series of laws created in the US to prevent future attacks in US soil. This 
Act drastically modified the US counter-terrorism legal framework.
40
 The USA Patriot 
Act gave law enforcement and intelligence service officials sweeping new powers to 
conduct searches without warrants, monitor financial transactions, eavesdrop, and 
secretly detain and deport individuals suspected of committing terrorist acts. These 
measures adopted implied human rights violations.
41
 This is evidenced by the fact that 
on May 30, 2015, when the USA Patriot Act expired, it was not renewed. Most people 
were in agreement that this Act contributed effectively to guarantee the security of the 
US (as there has not been major terrorist attacks since the 9/11). However after much 
discussion, the American authorities decided to replace the USA Patriot Act with the 
new USA Freedom Act, in order to try to solve the infringement of the right to privacy 
legally allowed by the previous measure.
42
 Nonetheless, the collection of information 
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could still be possible under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act and the 
Executive Order 12333.
43
 
After 9/11, the EU’s relationship with the US was transformed from an 
important trading relationship with embryonic security concerns, into an increasingly 
important security partnership. As a result of this relationship, the EU and US adopted a 
series of agreements to cooperate in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs. In 
particular, those measures enacted were the Agreement between the US and Europol 
(2002), the US - EU treaty on extradition and mutual legal assistance (MLA) (2003), the 
Agreement on Assistance in Criminal Matters (2003), the Agreement on intensifying 
and broadening the Agreement on customs cooperation and mutual assistance in 
customs matters to include cooperation in container security and related matters (2004), 
the Agreement between the USA and Eurojust (2006), the SWIFT (2010), and the PNR 
agreements of 2004, 2006 and 2007.
44 
The measures adopted implied the exchange of information received by their 
own intelligence agencies (such decision was also made on the level of the EU), 
extraditions, mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, customs cooperation, and the 
processing and transfer of passengers and bank operations data. Some scholars have 
described this cooperation as an asymmetric relationship, where the US is the dominant 
partner that significantly influenced the EU.
45
 Thus, under the context of intense US 
pressure, the EU showed its support to the US, and the European Council highlighted 
the importance of cooperation with the US to prevent future terrorist attacks.
46
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It is important to note that both the EU and the US share the conviction that the 
fight against terrorism must be based on a legal framework that ensures the respect for 
human rights. However, the priorities of the US and EU were not the same after the 
9/11. Numerous scholars have referred to the strong protection of human rights within 
the EU,
47
 in comparison to the US security regime. While the US put more focus on 
security, the EU maintained that the rights of the EU citizenship could not be restricted 
under any circumstance. The above-mentioned violations of human rights caused in the 
US can be explained by the military approach adopted by the Bush Administration. This 
approach assessed the terrorist activity of Al-Qaeda as a new type of conflict to which 
the existing rules of the American criminal justice system did not apply. The process of 
review of US counter-terrorism policy initiated by President Barack Obama led to a 
more favourable context for an EU-US counter-terrorism cooperation. 
As previously discussed, before the Paris shootings the US frequently exerted 
pressure on the EU to adopt its security agenda, and the EU has certainly adopted some 
policies that were originated in the US. The establishment of blacklists, massive data 
collection, unlimited retention periods, lack of oversight and no redress for EU citizens 
are few examples of the American influence in security matters. Even the various PNR 
agreements adopted by the EU, as well as the SWIFT agreement,
48
 have been 
influenced by US interests. In fact, the two of them may be considered as the most 
representative measures influenced by the US in counter-terrorism.
49
 All of the 
circumstances mentioned questions the true role of the EU as a counter-terrorism actor 
in the international stage.
50
 For all of these reasons, it can be concluded that the US 
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adopted a leading role to face the so called “Global War on Terror”, while the EU acted 
as a norm taker, at least until the recent terrorist attacks perpetrated in Paris. 
 
b) Limited competences of the EU 
Traditionally the EU had limited powers in the field of police and judicial 
cooperation, as the Member States preferred intergovernmental actions in this field. 
Despite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty gave the EU new tools and legitimacy to play a 
more important role in security matters, the current reality is that the EU still remains a 
marginal actor in counter-terrorism. Notwithstanding the stated priority of establishing 
an area of freedom, security and justice, national security (this includes internal security 
policies, legal affairs and intelligence) comes under the authority of the Member States, 
which are reluctant to give these powers to the EU. According to practitioners,
51
 around 
90% of the counter-terrorism activities are adopted by the Member States, leaving just 
10% of the decisions adopted at the EU level. Despite the progress that the EU has 
achieved, the Treaty of Lisbon has not shifted this ratio. 
Therefore, the current role of the EU is to support the Member States’ efforts in 
counter-terrorism. The EU has a variety of means to support its Member States. The 
main EU counter-terrorism action is the coordination and harmonisation between 
Member States of their own security measures and policies.
52
 This coordinating role of 
the EU has proved to be very important. The EU works for creating a legal environment 
and framework for cooperation. This becomes clear when one reads the Counter-
Terrorism Strategy, which reorganised all of the previously adopted measures into a 
single framework. Another example of this coordinating role is the creation of the CTC. 
In words of the former CTC, Gijs de Bries: “The European Union's role is to support 
Member States in their fight against terrorism as the necessary instruments lie in the 
hands of the individual countries”.53 The EU also supports Member States’ efforts by 
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developing common capabilities and systems (such as SIS), providing fund to Member 
States (such as the Internal Security Fund or the External Borders Fund),
54
 and by 
supporting the establishment of concrete and operational cooperation between 
practitioners and front line actors.
55
 
However, an obstacle for establishing a common counter-terrorism policy has 
been the differing views and interests among Member States in how to confront 
terrorism -or its corollary, the absence of an EU interest-. This was evident after the 
Paris shootings, when Member States reacted to the terrorist attacks in different ways. 
Some Member States have shown reluctance to implement common counter-terrorism 
tools, as national policy makers do not want to renounce to their competences in 
security matters. It is not only the Member States that differ in their priorities. This also 
happens between the EU institutions themselves, mainly on issues such as data privacy 
or intelligence-sharing. This situation may change after the Paris attacks, as it is similar 
to the situation produced after Madrid and London attacks, when the interest of national 
policy makers to regulate gradually declined.
56
 As a result, the EU counter-terrorism 
strategy has depended until now of the swinging national interest, making very difficult 
to establish a coherent strategy at the EU level. It is also important to highlight that the 
process of constructing a European interest has become more complex after the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, as it increased the number of actors involved in the 
process. This is basically due to the growing importance of the EP in JHA area.
57
 
In addition, both the lack of operational capacities of Europol and Eurojust
58
 and 
the absence of a clear external dimension of the EU counter-terrorism policy have made 
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the establishment of a coherent strategy to fight against terrorism at the supranational 
level difficult. 
Therefore, despite the EU has put its efforts to play a more important 
coordinating role in the field of law enforcement, the impediments above-mentioned has 
made its actions less important and influential, according to its position as a global 
power. After the recent events however, this situation may change, increasing the 
influence of the EU as a counter-terrorism global actor. 
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V. NEW BALANCE AFTER THE PARIS ATTACKS 
a) Security measures proposed by Governments 
On January 7, 2015 the EU was the target of new terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda. 
The fatal events occurred in Paris and other locations in the Île-de-France region, ended 
up with twenty people killed, including nine employees at the satirical weekly 
newspaper Charlie Hebdo, three French National Police officers, and four hostages. A 
month later, on February 14, 2015, a Danish-born man broke into the venue of a free 
speech debate and tried to get into a Jewish synagogue, killing 2 people and injuring 5 
police officers. 
These attacks have prompted a debate in the EU on strengthening its counter-
terrorism strategy. Only one day after the attacks, the European Commission President 
Jean-Claude Juncker asserted that the EU was going to draw up new proposals to fight 
terrorism. Both the Member States and the EU announced their plans to establish new 
counter-terrorism measures. The heads of the Government of the Member States, as 
well as their Ministers of the Interior, met in several occasions to discuss the necessity 
of adopting new EU security measures to prevent Europeans from going to fight 
alongside jihadist militants in Syria and Iraq, and returning to carry out attacks in the 
EU. Thus on April 28, 2015, the Commission announced the adoption of the European 
Agenda on Security, setting out key priorities and actions for the period 2015-
2020.
59
  This Agenda should be taken into consideration by the EP and the Council for 
transposing its ideas into a new and more effective Internal Security Strategy. Many of 
these measures are not new but have stalled for years in the face of resistance from 
some Member States. 
Most measures discussed can be divided into two main priorities: those which 
try to hamper the travel movements of terrorists, including the so-called foreign fighters 
and European nationals crossing the EU’s external borders, and those which try to 
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eliminate terrorist propaganda, particularly on the internet, in order to tackle the root 
causes of radicalisation, especially among young people.
60
 
In the particular field of data protection, many events have occurred. In the 
aftermath of the Paris and Copenhagen attacks, numerous Member States expressed 
their intention to adopt national PNRs, a measure which could be included among the 
first group of measures mentioned, as it collects data from passengers entering and 
departing the EU area. Some EU leaders called for the rapid adoption of the stalled 
project of establishing an EU PNR system.
61
 There is a debate on whether to establish 
an EU PNR or adopt various national PNRs, which would not be as effective as a 
common EU PNR, in terms of offering the highest level of security and data 
protection.
62
 The adoption of an EU PNR agreement was already proposed by the 
Commission, subsequent to the failed attack in London, in June 2007.
63
 The EP is 
currently studying the compliance of the proposed EU PNR agreement with the EU 
legal order, and its protection of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter. PNRs 
contain sensitive data which has to be used correctly. It appears to be that the EP has the 
intention to amend the agreement in terms of compliance with the purpose limitation 
principle, retention of data, external oversight, and data access. Interestingly, some 
members of the EP (MEPs) and the Council have proven to be in favour of collecting 
data, not only from third-country nationals coming in and out the EU area, but from 
flights within the EU. This would be necessary as a major concern is European jihadists 
returning from the Middle East. As they are European citizens they have the right to 
move freely in the EU area. Focusing the attention exclusively on the external borders 
does not stop the danger, as the Paris and Copenhagen attacks have proven. 
Nevertheless, the civil liberties committee of the European Parliament (LIBE) has so far 
blocked this measure, on the grounds that it does not offer sufficient safeguards against 
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violations of fundamental rights to privacy and data protection. One of the main 
demands of the EP is that the EU PNR should not be adopted before the EU adopts a 
directive covering the rules for the exchange of data between police and judicial 
authorities, which would serve as a legal basis for the EU PNR, and would imply a 
better protection of the rights of the EU citizens.
64
 The future of an EU PNR should be 
decided after the CJEU gives its opinion on the challenged PNR agreement with 
Canada, and its compliance with the EU treaties. Should be stated that an EU PNR is an 
important and necessary measure to be adopted due to its vast capacity to increase 
security within the EU borders, while the action of the CJEU should guarantee its 
compliance with the respect for the EU fundamental rights. 
Another of the numerous measures proposed in the aftermath of the Paris attacks 
which could have consequences in counter-terrorism is the establishment of the so-
called “smart borders” (project AMBERLIGHT 2015, also known as “border 
package”),65 launched on April 1, 2015.66 The aim of this measure is to intensify border 
checks in the EU external borders, in order to collect data from “overstayers” (people 
who stay in the EU area beyond their visa period, e.g.: visitors, students or business 
people) in the EU area. This data collected would be used to check automatically if 
third-country nationals who enter the EU depart before their visas expire. “Overstayers” 
represent a threat to internal security and the EU needed to harmonize its law and 
sanctions. The fact that overstay detections are more numerous every day, and that 
third-country nationals try to leave the EU area via other Member State, proves the 
shortcomings in the existing legal procedures and the practical processing in this field. 
For a proper enforcement of this measure the EU should enhance its functioning and 
competences, as currently Frontex cannot know whether third-country nationals depart 
from the Member State where they overstayed or from another one in order to mask the 
violation. The Council of the EU expressed that no personal data was going to be 
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gathered within the establishment of the “smart borders”,67 in order to preserve the right 
to privacy of the EU citizenship. 
Another measure discussed related with borders as well is the reintroduction of 
systematic passport checks on borders within the Schengen area, as well as more 
stringent controls on the Schengen’s external borders. However, the European 
Commission has expressed its opposition to this measure, arguing that Member States 
are able to tackle the freedom of movement of potential terrorists by using already 
existing mechanisms, such as the SIS II. In fact, the SIS II is one of the most effective 
tools to prevent terrorism, although Member States are not using it properly as national 
intelligence services are reluctant to share its information.
68
 
Furthermore, the EU has announced its intention to enhance the powers of some 
EU bodies as Europol, IntCen, and Eurojust. The European Agenda on Security sets out 
the Union’s strategy to facilitate better information sharing, and to increase operational 
cooperation between police and judicial authorities of the Member States and with EU 
Agencies. The EU has many information exchange systems, although the possibilities of 
these instruments are not fully exploited. In fact, Europol is the Agency of the EU that 
exchanges the most information, not only within the EU but outside as well, sending 
more than 20.000 messages a year to third countries.
69
 Moreover, the European Agenda 
on Security has proposed to step up Europol’s role by establishing a European Counter 
Terrorist Centre, for the exchange of information among national law enforcement 
authorities.
70
 Europol made public the idea that foreign fighters might pose a threat to 
the EU for the first time in its report: The Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2014.
71
 
In this report the Europol stated that returning fighters “have the potential to utilise this 
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training, combat experience, knowledge and contacts for terrorist activities in the EU”. 
Europol will also play a crucial role on fighting the relatively-new phenomenon of 
cybercrime. 
In addition to all these measures, in the current political debate other measures 
have been suggested, such as increasing internet surveillance (the European Agenda on 
Security has proposed to launch an EU-level forum with IT companies to develop tools 
against terrorist propaganda online),
72
 the establishment of an European CIA equivalent, 
intercepting communications without court orders (including the access to Whatsapp 
and other instant-messaging applications), and strengthening the fight against terrorism 
financing.
73
  
 
b) Balance between security and the rights of the EU citizenship 
“We must not minimise our freedom of thought or revise downward our 
European values in the face of violence and Kalashnikovs” exerted Martin Schulz, the 
President of the EP, in the aftermath of Charlie Hebdo attacks.
74
 
In line with the words of Mr. Schurlz, it is convenient to take into consideration 
that the EU has presently the highest standards of protection of human rights in the 
world, which is one of the treasures of the contemporary Europe. The protection of the 
EU fundamental rights according to the TUE and the Charter is part of the EU policy to 
fight terrorism in the AFSJ.
75
 For this reason, the adoption of the above-mentioned new 
security legal framework is intended to be adopted preserving the rights of the European 
citizenship. In order to achieve this, the EP and the CJEU play a crucial role. It is 
essential to take into consideration the Charter when adopting the new measures for an 
adequate preservation of the EU fundamental rights, as well as to avoid the processes of 
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challenging all these new possible measures to the CJEU, and conflicts derived from the 
processes. It is essential to find a balance between the principles of necessity and 
proportionality. 
Nevertheless, it seems the EU might be experiencing a new approach in the field 
of security after the attacks in Paris and Copenhagen. As it has been described, the 
recent attacks committed in EU soil could lead to the adoption of a series of security 
measures similar to the USA Patriot Act in the US. The tendency to a global 
harmonisation on security is noticeable. The initial concerns of some EU authorities 
after Edward Snowden’s revelations regarding the US espionage activities seems to be 
now disappearing in an attempt by the EU to expand surveillance measures. 
In the recent years, the CJEU has delivered numerous judgments assessing the 
flaws in the protection of the EU fundamental rights as regards to counter-terrorism 
restrictive measures. In the particular field of data protection, a consequential decision 
was announced on April 8, 2014.
76
 Although the case was brought to the CJEU for not 
being adopted under the proper legal basis, the Court annulled the controversial DRD 
for being contrary to articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. Despite the CJEU admitted the 
necessity of a measure such as the DRD, it concluded that the measure was 
disproportional for not being possible to establish a link between the data retained and 
the threat to public security. The CJEU stated that there was a need to establish limits to 
what it was strictly necessary, and the DRD was not compatible with the Charter. Thus, 
the CJEU considered that the DRD entailed a serious interference in fundamental rights, 
to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data. Furthermore, it is 
important to take into consideration the fact that since December 2014, the CJEU is able 
to examine new measures, even if they were adopted previously. This was not possible 
before, as it was established a transitional period of five years after the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon, by which the CJEU could not examine new measures.
77
 
Therefore, this situation may have consequences for other measures, such as the 
Swedish Innitiative, Prüm or the various PNRs. 
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Consequently, if all databases mentioned in this research are not used 
appropriately, this could imply an infringement of the right of privacy.
78
 
Another right which may be infringed in the fight against terrorism could be the 
freedom of expression.
79
 As mentioned, the EU and the Member States are doing a vast 
effort to counter terrorism propaganda, especially on the internet. For instance, ISIS has 
proved fluent in Youtube, Twitter, Instagram, Tumblr, internet memes, among other 
social media.
80
 There is a need to establish very clearly the line that separates a political 
or ideological opinion from a call for terrorism. 
Traditionally one of the human rights infringed in the fight against terrorism has 
been the right of not being tortured.
81
 Torture has been a considerable concern in the 
global “war on terror”, especially in the US where there has been various cases revealed 
during the last decade
82
 (during the Bush administration it was even debated the 
possibility of legalizing torture in case of emergency).
83
 Despite in Europe the 
infringement of this right is not a major concern such as in the US, a number of 
countries have also been implicated in tortures, in particular in the form of complicity in 
renditions that have often resulted in torture.
84
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If there are finally adopted measures such as the re-imposition of internal border 
controls within the Schengen area, this would affect inevitably to the right of free 
movement of people within the EU.
85
 At the same time, the proposed “oversecurisation” 
of the EU borders would imply the establishment of stricter checks on people entering 
the Schengen area, which could also have consequences on the right of free movement 
of persons (in case these people are Europeans citizens, as third-country nationals do not 
have this right). 
Furthermore, it has been debated the possibility of reducing the supply of 
firearms among the EU, which could be understand as an infringement of the right of 
free movement of goods in the internal market.
86
 However, as far as the problem is the 
trafficking of illegal firearms, this cannot be understood at any level as an infringement 
of the freedom of goods. If it were proposed to reduce the supply of legal firearms 
(which despite could be an interesting debate, it has not been discussed so far) then this 
answer regarding the free movement of goods could be debatable. 
Another right which may be infringed when adopting the new measures 
discussed could be the right of non-discrimination.
87
 Ethnicity and race-based profiling 
is a major concern in the EU, as in the past minorities and immigrant communities have 
reported discriminatory treatment.
88
 Ethnic profiling occurs most often in police 
decisions about whom to stop, question, search, and even arrest. The sensitivity 
produced after Paris and Copenhagen attacks may increase this problem. 
                                                          
85
 Established in the fourth title of the third part of the TFEU. 
86
 Established in the second title of the third part of the TFEU. 
87
 Given by the article 21 of the Charter. 
88
 European Parliament. Ethnicity and Race-based profiling in counter-terrorism, law enforcement and 
border control. [Online] http://www.europarl.europa.eu. Consulted on 19/05/15.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 Throughout this study it was possible to see how the EU has been increasing its 
actorness in security matters from the early 1970s to now, despite the competences in 
this field belongs to the Member States. The 9/11 implied a turning point in counter-
terrorism worldwide. Under an intense pressure from the US, the EU adopted a vast 
number of measures in counter-terrorism. Although most of these measures were 
influenced to some extent by the American interests, the EU never renounced to its high 
standards of protection of the rights of its citizens. Subsequent to the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon and the new binding effects of the Charter, the EU acquired a new 
legal framework to develop its security strategy, and also to guarantee a higher 
protection of the EU fundamental rights. 
 Notwithstanding the evolution of the security measures which the Lisbon Treaty 
implied, the EU does not yet have its own security policy. The Member States have 
shown in many occasions different views in how to deal with terrorism. Furthermore, as 
security matters have been traditionally linked with sovereignty, the Member States 
have not agreed at ceding its competences in security to the EU. 
 The Charlie Hebdo attacks appear to have been a decisive moment for counter-
terrorism in Europe. EU leaders reacted strongly to the attacks, and announced a series 
of important measures, which seems to lead to a common EU security policy. These 
attacks had a vast impact on EU citizens, who does not feel secure anymore, especially 
in major cities. The citizens of the EU now seem to share the conviction that sacrificing 
their high fundamental rights standards in order to increase security standards is worth 
it. This situation is very similar to the one that occurred in the US after the 9/11. 
 Admitting the major importance of maintaining security, it seems dangerous the 
shift in the EU priorities. The high level of protection of the EU fundamental rights is a 
European achievement which defines the EU as a society. The EU must tell the world 
that it does not recognize terrorism as a tool for changing society. As Islamic terrorists 
have as one of their goal changing the European society, reducing the EU fundamental 
rights standards would inevitably imply a victory for terrorism. This would be a victory 
of terror over democracy. 
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 Some rights of the EU citizenship are at stake, such as the right to privacy, the 
right to not being discriminated, and the right of free movement within the EU. To 
preserve these rights, the role of the CJEU and the EP is essential. The menace of 
jihadists with EU passports represents a complex threat to give a legal response, but the 
EU must enhance the security in EU soil without renouncing to the rights of the EU 
citizens and their European identity.  
In any case, it is important to take into consideration that most counter-terrorism 
measures relate to the medium and long run. In the short run are fewer options. 
Traditionally the EU counter-terrorism actions have been adopted as urgent responses to 
the attacks occurred (as example, the European Arrest Warrant and the setting up of 
Eurojust were taken after the 9/11 attacks; also, the EU first counter-terrorism strategy 
and the DRD were adopted after the Madrid and London attacks, in 2005). It would be 
wise to plan a sensitive and well-structured counter-terrorism strategy, taking into 
consideration all ramifications of the present moment. It would be sensitive that the EU 
rather than focusing on radical initiatives as the establishment of a European CIA, or the 
re-imposition of border controls, it would bring the position of the Member States 
closer, and agree to make a better use of the counter-terrorism instruments already 
existing at their disposal. In addition, a stricter regulation for the use of weapons is 
necessary, as a vital factor in the success of the Paris shootings was the terrorists’ access 
to weapons. It is important as well the social aspect of the Islamic terrorism. Many EU 
countries have large and growing Muslim minorities, and while the vast majority of 
Muslims are not involved in radical activities, the numerous attacks committed in the 
last decade highlight questions about whether EU governments have done enough, both 
to integrate Muslims into the European society and to counter Islamist extremism. In 
order to stop anti Muslim feelings among the EU citizenship, as well as the spread of 
Islamic terrorism in the EU, public authorities have to promote dialogue and tolerance, 
and prevent defamation of the Islamic religion. The effective integration of European 
Muslims into the European society is vital. 
Finally, it is necessary to considerate that all the measures mentioned in this 
study have as a goal the increase of security inside the EU borders, but it does not solve 
the problem internationally. As a matter of fact, the vast majority of the terrorist attacks 
that are committed nowadays in the world take place outside the EU borders, and also 
outside the Western world. Extremist Islamism is a global threat which has to disappear 
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worldwide. It seems appropriated that the EU and its allies carry on military operations 
in the land of the operating bases of ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Jabhad al-Nusra, and Boko Haram 
to reduce the menace of these organizations in the short term. In the long term the 
military option will not bring the solution. Good governance in Middle East countries, 
with focus on the Human Rights and the fight against corruption, it is going to be 
essential in order to end with this nonsense for good. 
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